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Competitive Regulation of Mobile Software 
Systems: Promoting Innovation Through 
Reform of Antitrust and Patent Laws 
Josh Baskin* 
This Note analyzes the current antitrust regulatory framework for high tech, iteratively 
evolving computer and software systems. This issue has significant implications for the 
current economy as many modern technology companies base their entire business 
model on such systems. This Note examines the problems concerning software patents 
through an analysis of two well-known mobile phone operating systems: Apple’s iOS 
and Google’s Android.  
 
This Note also examines the current regulatory framework that prevents large 
companies from taking anticompetitive actions to expand their power in fast-moving 
high tech markets at the expense of smaller competitors—specifically tying, predatory 
innovation, refusal to deal or license, sham litigation, and overbroad software patents. 
This Note also proposes several changes to both antitrust and patent laws that will 
make it more difficult for established market players to prevent new competitors from 
entering high tech markets, thereby promoting greater openness and innovation. These 
changes include modernizing sham litigation, reducing the number of patent 
infringement actions by allowing reverse engineering of software patent and an 
independent invention defense, and increased scrutiny of the business improvements 
antitrust defense.  
 
Each of these proposed changes targets the promotion of innovation by enabling the 
entry of new players into established markets without the threat of expensive litigation 
constantly undermining the compatibility and efficiency of the products that they 
attempt to bring to market.  
 
 * J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013. B.A. University of 
California, Berkeley, Economics, 2010. I extend my thanks to the editors of the Hastings Law Journal 
for their suggestions, support, and editorial assistance. I would also like to thank Professor Dorit Reiss 
for her suggestions and feedback throughout the editing process.  
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Innovation defines the high tech industry. To survive and thrive, 
high tech companies must continually update and improve their products 
or risk losing market share to their competitors. Technology companies 
increasingly seek to ensure survival by making their products essential to 
consumers’ technology ecosystems: Once a consumer finds a certain 
technology irreplaceable, she is much more likely to purchase additional 
electronics that are compatible with the irreplaceable product, generating 
an ecosystem of connected devices. The companies that own the primary 
devices in such systems control the entire system. These companies can 
limit access to their own products—creating a closed system—or they can 
allow anyone to create a device that fully interacts with other devices in 
the system, creating an open system. 
This Note explores the current regulatory framework for open and 
closed networked systems. It recommends several reforms to curb 
anticompetitive conduct and retain intellectual property protection, and 
encourages continued innovation within an industry that depends on 
iterative improvements of its products. In particular, this Note focuses on 
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the promotion of generative systems that promise the greatest possibility 
of innovation in the future. The goal of these recommendations is to allow 
small start-up companies with limited legal resources—the standard form 
of entry into high tech industry—to innovate without anticompetitive legal 
threats from established players that can spend lavishly on legal resources. 
Networked systems create an incredible regulatory challenge. 
Inventors of such systems require incentive to create, but granting them 
too much control over a system’s underlying ideas will stymie new 
inventions that the system inspires. Hence, there is a tension between 
strong intellectual property rights in invention and promotion of growth 
through iterative improvement. 
Classifying systems on an open-to-closed scale measures this 
tension. Open systems allow broad compatibility between many different 
devices. Closed systems, on the other hand, tend to limit access between 
parts through specific rules or only allow preapproved components to 
connect to the system in the first place. As further detailed in Part I, each 
type of system exhibits its own benefits and drawbacks. 
In an ideal world, regulators would seek open and stable systems, 
which provide the greatest potential for innovation while maintaining 
security, privacy, and stability. In the real world, there is a trade-off 
between allowing openness (or maximum compatibility and customizability) 
and providing security, stability, and protection for rights-holders, which in 
its own right spurs more innovation. 
This Note focuses on two directly competing open and closed 
systems within the same market—mobile operating systems dominated 
by Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS—as proxies for networked 
systems in general. It examines each system’s current regulatory field and 
proposes changes to antitrust and patent laws that will encourage open 
and generative systems, which are likely to promote the most continued 
innovation in the industry. 
Part I examines the history of open and closed computer systems 
from their inception and provides brief histories of both Android and iOS. 
Part II describes the current regulatory structure in place for Android and 
iOS in terms of software and cellular phone markets under antitrust, 
intellectual property, and consumer protection regimes. Part III makes 
four recommendations to improve the competitiveness and innovative 
power of these markets: (1) Modernize the antitrust sham litigation claim; 
(2) allow reverse engineering of patents; (3) provide an independent 
invention defense to patent infringement; and (4) allow the use of intent 
evidence to analyze business improvement defenses. All of these reforms 
would incentivize innovation by removing legal barriers that allow 
established firms to enforce monopolies against start-up operations.  
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I.  Systems Background: iOS and Android 
The history and development of computer systems highlights the 
struggle between open accessible systems and closed compatible ones. A 
system is “a group of devices or artificial objects or an organization 
forming a network esp[ecially] for distributing something or serving a 
common purpose.”1 Systems combine components that may have little 
value on their own but substantial value when combined with 
complementary components. For example, a computer requires a 
processor, memory, storage, and an interface to be useful. By themselves, 
each of these components has little value: A computer processor has no 
value if it has no access to data, but together these components form a 
powerful machine capable of almost infinite uses. 
In order for a system to function properly, all of its components 
must work together. Systems that are more open allow interoperability 
and portability between the different components. Closed systems have 
strict requirements that allow only the use of a limited set of components. 
Drawing a line between open and closed systems is an impossible task 
because one measures the level of openness relative to all other systems. 
Instead, the open-closed system classification runs along a scale from the 
theoretical maximums of completely open to completely closed. 
No system can be completely open; there must be some limits in 
order to ensure that the individual parts work together. Likewise, no 
system is completely closed. For example, every computer system needs 
electricity to function, which means it must have a component that is 
compatible with an electricity delivery system. Open systems are generally 
compatible with a greater variety of components than closed systems. As 
a result, open systems allow more modification via external devices than 
closed ones.  
Computer systems developed along two different business models: 
one that was almost completely closed2 and another that was almost 
 
 1. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 1184 (1973). 
 2. IBM marketed the first computer mainframes, which they sold as almost completely closed 
systems. See Kevin Maney, The Maverick and His Machine 100 (2003). Starting with a punch card 
machine invented by Herman Hollerith, IBM primarily sold computer mainframes to the U.S. 
government and many of the world’s largest companies by the 1960s. Jonathan Zittrain, The Future 
of the Internet and How to Stop It 11–12 (2008). The company’s business model revolved around 
leasing a complete system to each client. Id. The leases covered hardware, software, maintenance, and 
training. Id. at 12. Each mainframe came installed with software tailored to the client. Id. Accordingly, 
IBM gave each client a customized machine for its business that could not be improved or changed 
without consulting IBM. Id. IBM designed these systems as completely closed. End users could not 
modify their functionality or add additional devices; only IBM software and hardware could connect 
to these systems. Id. IBM adopted this model in part because its technology was so new customers did 
not have the expertise or even ability to functionally modify any mainframes they purchased. Id. The 
IBM leasing model is the closest computers have ever come to a closed system. 
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completely open.3 Modern computers have settled somewhere in the 
middle.4 
This Note compares two mobile phone operating systems as proxies 
for computer systems generally: Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS. They 
are the two leading operating systems for cellular phones.5 Each is the 
center of a competing ecosystem of cellular phones. As direct competitors, 
both systems have the same core functionality but rely on completely 
different business models. This makes them ideal for an analysis and 
comparison of the regulatory framework for high tech networked systems. 
Apple’s iOS is based on the same philosophy as the 1984 Macintosh 
and the original IBM punch card machines from the 1890s.6 iOS is only 
compatible with one set of hardware: the iPhone. When it was released in 
2007, no one had ever seen a system like it. iOS is a mostly closed system:7 
It is only compatible with Apple hardware8 and can only connect to 
computers through Apple-made software.9 Any semblance of openness 
in iOS originates in its App Store, which allows third-parties to interface 
between their products and iOS. Even so, Apple only allows users to 
install applications through its carefully controlled iTunes service, and it 
 
 3. The first personal computers exhibited the characteristics of open systems. In their infancy, 
companies like Intel and Texas Instruments sold individual components, like processors and memory 
chips, that hobbyists combined together to create the first personal computers. See Paul E. Ceruzzi, A 
History of Modern Computing 222–26 (I. Bernard Cohen & William Aspray eds., 2d ed. 2003); 
Zittrain, supra note 2, at 13. These systems were completely open—the hobbyist purchased each individual 
component separately and assembled the machine herself. For example, some of the earliest systems could 
use standard televisions as displays and cassette players to store data. Id. The user could install the software 
of her choice on her system. Id. In the early years, personal computers were mostly a hobbyist’s activity that 
required interchangeability between parts. Consequently, open design choices reigned. 
 4. As computer systems became more accessible, their design gravitated toward the center of the 
spectrum, although not completely by choice. Entrepreneurs like Steve Jobs understood that mass-
producing a standardized personal computer complete with all necessary components meant a more 
reliable, efficient, and cheaper computer for consumers. Ceruzzi, supra note 3, at 264. The company 
he co-founded, Apple, Inc., released the forerunner to modern computer systems, the Macintosh, in 
1984. Id. at 273. Unlike previous personal computers, the Macintosh was closed, meaning users could 
not add additional hardware or modify the physical system itself. Id. at 275. Additionally, because 
Apple wanted to retain control over the entire system, and for technical reasons, users were required 
to use Apple’s own operating system. Id. at 276. Despite this restriction, users could install whatever 
programs they wished on to their Apple computers without Apple’s permission. See Zittrain, supra 
note 2, at 16. In fact, Apple encouraged users to write programs that could run on the operating 
system, so the entire system remained relatively open. See id. at 11–18. 
 5. Zack Epstein, Android and iOS Regain Market Share in January as BlackBerry Slides, BGR, 
(Feb. 1, 2012, 3:40 PM), http://www.bgr.com/2012/02/01/android-and-ios-regain-market-share-in-january-
as-blackberry-slides. 
 6. See supra note 2; Ceruzzi, supra note 3, at 275. 
 7. The original iOS offered no App Store and disallowed users from installing any of their own 
software on the phone itself. 
 8. Compatible hardware includes the iPhone and, more recently, the iPod Touch and the iPad. 
See Apple iOS, http://www.apple.com/ios (last visited July 30, 2013). 
 9. See Apple iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes (last visited July 30, 2013). 
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carefully vets applications before they reach the market.10 Furthermore, 
Apple restricts programmers from accessing the full power of the 
iPhone’s hardware itself.11 
The development of Google’s Android system is analogous to the 
personal computer revolution.12 Since the beginning, it has been an open-
source system: Any phone manufacturer can make a phone that runs on 
Android. Google does not restrict applications from running on its 
system.13 Furthermore, development is not artificially restricted14 as on 
Apple’s platform; software on the Android system can access the same 
interfaces available to its manufacturers. 
Both iOS and Android contain the same core functionality. They are 
direct substitutes in an economic sense and face similar regulatory 
problems from a competition and innovation perspective. However, one 
developed as a closed system and the other as an open one. A review of 
the existing regulatory body of law applicable to both systems underscores 
the significance of this distinction. 
II.  Overview of the Existing Regulation of Android and iOS 
Existing regulation of Android and iOS falls into two categories: 
antitrust and intellectual property. Antitrust regulation seeks to ensure a 
competitive marketplace and to prevent anticompetitive monopolization 
of a market. Intellectual property—in this case patents—rewards inventors 
by granting them a limited monopoly over the use of their inventions for a 
limited period of time. 
A. Antitrust 
Congress designed American antitrust law to protect competition 
and consumers. Antitrust law encompasses two main areas: combinations 
in restraint of trade (violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act)15 and 
 
 10. See Apple App Review, https://developer.apple.com/appstore/guidelines.html (last visited July 
30, 2013). 
 11. See Apple iOS App Programming Guide, https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/ 
#documentation/iPhone/Conceptual/iPhoneOSProgrammingGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html (last 
visited July 30, 2013). 
 12. See supra note 3. 
 13. Google does not subject applications to pre-screening before allowing them onto its online 
marketplace, but reserves the right to remove them if they violate the terms of service. In any event, 
the Android software itself allows users to install programs directly onto the phone, a feature that iOS 
lacks. Google’s app distribution system “Google Play” is optional for developers. They can distribute 
apps using their own sources. See Android Other Developer Servs., http://developer.android.com/ 
legal.html (last visited July 30, 2013). For an example of third-party app distribution systems, see 
Simon Hill, Tired of Google Play? Check out these Alternative Android App Stores, Digital Trends 
(Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/android-app-stores.  
 14. See supra note 2. 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
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monopolization of trade (violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act).16 
Section 1 violations occur when two or more parties conspire to restrain 
trade through an agreement.17 A company violates section 2 when it 
possesses or attempts to possess monopoly power in the relevant market 
and willfully maintains that power in an anticompetitive manner, 
“distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”18 Monopolization 
generally requires a showing that a company attempted, acquired, or 
maintained market power in a relevant market defined by product and 
geography through exclusionary conduct.19 
Courts have struggled defining both the relevant market and 
exclusionary conduct. This Note does not discuss problems related to 
relevant market definition because it focuses on regulation of a specific 
market. Both iOS and Android possess large market shares and the 
ability to affect both the price and market output for cell phones and 
operating system software. In other words, each has monopoly power20 in 
the market. As a result, any action taken by either company will have a 
dramatic effect on those markets as a whole. The discussion below 
focuses on these markets intricacies. However, monopoly power is 
required to sustain claims of tying, predatory innovation, or refusal to 
deal or license. These antitrust concerns will therefore only apply to 
market-dominating products like iOS and Android, as opposed to all 
networked systems. 
The difficulty in applying antitrust principles to new technology lies 
in defining exclusionary, or anticompetitive, conduct. Courts have long 
been wary of applying the Sherman Act to markets in which they have 
little experience because they have been reluctant to over-regulate the 
economy.21 The primary types of exclusionary conduct involving technology 
include tying,22 predatory innovation,23 refusal to deal or license in the 
 
 16. Id. § 2. 
 17. Id. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade . . . .”). This Note concerns unilateral actions of competitor companies who do not 
license to each other and who seem intent on competition with each other so it will not focus on 
section 1 violations. See Erica Ogg, Steve Jobs Vowed to “Destroy” Android, GigaOM (Oct. 21, 2011, 
6:56 AM), http://www.gigaom.com/2011/10/21/steve-jobs-vowed-to-destroy-android. 
 18. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
 19. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 20. The Supreme Court has alternatively defined monopoly power as “the ability to raise prices 
above those that would be charged in a competitive market,” NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984), or “the power to control prices or exclude competition.” United 
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). For a more thorough discussion of 
the definition of monopoly power (a term used synonymously with market power) see Thomas G. 
Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 Geo. L.J. 241 (1987). 
 21. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1979). 
 22. See Eastman Kodak Co., v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461–62 (1992). 
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patent context,24 and sham intellectual property infringement actions.25 
This Note considers each type of conduct in the context of Android and 
iOS and the economic activities of smaller companies that rely on these 
systems as the bases for their innovation. 
1. Tying 
“A tying arrangement is ‘an agreement by a party to sell one 
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a 
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase 
that product from any other supplier.’”26 A tying agreement is unlawful 
where it substantially impacts interstate commerce, where the seller 
offers two products exclusively as a unit, and where the seller has 
“economic power” in the tying product.27 Tying arrangements are 
anticompetitive because they permit the seller to exploit its “control over 
the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product 
that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to 
purchase elsewhere on different terms.”28 
In a seminal tying case, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Services (“Kodak I”), the Supreme Court examined Kodak’s replacement 
parts policy and articulated tying doctrine as applied to a technologically 
innovative market.29 When Kodak began selling high-volume photocopiers, 
it allowed independent services organizations (“ISOs”) to buy replacement 
parts directly from the company or the original licensed manufacturer.30 
Kodak later amended its policy and only sold replacement parts to buyers 
of Kodak equipment or end users to repair their own equipment.31 As a 
result, many ISOs found themselves unable to obtain parts and Kodak 
forced them out of the market for servicing Kodak machines.32 Image 
Technical Services, Inc. alleged that Kodak’s amended parts policy violated 
section 2 because it tied the market for services to the market for parts.33 
Kodak I had two significant holdings. First, a single brand of a 
product or service can be a relevant market under the Sherman Act.34 
 
 23. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d. Cir 1979); Foremost Pro 
Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d.534, 544–45 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 24. See Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 25. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig, 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 26. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 461 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 
(1958)). 
 27. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984). 
 28. Id. at 12. 
 29. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 457. 
 30. Id. at 458. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 459. 
 34. Id. at 481–82. 
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This is significant because it opens the door for suits against companies 
that attempt to control industries that stem from a product they have 
created. Second, the Court held that as a matter of law, a “valid business 
justification” can excuse actions that would otherwise be inconsistent 
with section 2 of the Sherman Act.35 Valid business justifications include, 
among other things, technical improvements to products or services 
including increased compatibility and security. More recently, courts have 
been reluctant to dismiss justifications provided by manufacturers as 
invalid business justifications for fear of stifling innovation.36 
It is theoretically possible to frame a tying case against either Android 
or iOS. In the case of iOS as the tying product, the tied product could be 
either the iPhone itself,37 or it could be the iTunes App Store, which serves 
as the exclusive gateway for customers to obtain digital content on their 
phones.38 Apple certainly has “economic power” in the tying product: It 
is the sole producer of iOS, just as Kodak is the sole producer of its copy 
machines. Sales of iPhones and iOS certainly affect a substantial amount 
of interstate commerce. An analogous prima facie claim would replace 
Android as the tying product and the Android Market as the tied product.39 
A theoretical tying claim regarding Android or iOS would not and 
should not survive in court. Both Apple and Google have many valid 
business justifications, as outlined in Kodak I. Most prominent among 
these is the need for compatibility, security, and simplicity for consumers 
to use their devices. Given the reluctance of courts to declare business 
justifications invalid, these justifications can and should prevent plaintiffs 
from suing cell phone operating system manufacturers for tying under 
section 2. 
The Court’s unwillingness to find a tying violation in light of a valid 
business justification creates a large loophole for platform owners, such 
as Apple and Google, to use against smaller entities looking to build 
upon those systems. For example, Apple has prevented the installation of 
certain applications on iOS that may compete with an application made 
 
 35. Id. at 483. 
 36. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 37. Apple considers the iPhone to be part of the iOS system and therefore part of the market. See 
Apple iOS, http://www.apple.com/iphone/ios (last visited July 30, 2013). Two rationales undercut this 
argument. First, Android, iOS’s strongest competitor, performs the same core functions but is 
designed independently of the phone’s hardware. Second, iOS is installable on two different devices, 
one of which is not a cellular phone. 
 38. See Jeffrey Jarosch, Novel “Neutrality” Claims Against Internet Platforms: A Reasonable 
Framework for Initial Scrutiny, 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 537, 584 (2011). 
 39. Note that the more open Android system is less likely to lead to illegal tying because it 
promotes compatibility between itself and any other component, while the closed iOS system can 
theoretically be tied to any outside system with which it interacts. 
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by Apple.40 In essence, Apple could block any software that it feels 
competes with one of the core features of iOS, essentially tying iOS and 
what could be a proprietary feature together. A business justification is 
easy in that scenario: Apple could claim that a version of the software is 
more secure and prevents hardware failure at a better rate than its 
competitor’s version. This is certainly a valid business justification under 
the current framework. Conveniently, it also allows Apple to eliminate 
competitors—especially small firms that rely on Apple’s iOS as a platform 
to distribute their products—and potential innovators from the market.41 
On the other hand, open systems like Android promote compatibility 
and interoperability between the maximum number of components. To 
this end, Android does not restrict installation of specific applications 
through the Play Store, its version of the App Store. Further, it allows 
users to install applications from sources outside the Play Store. This 
exemplifies the competitive benefits of open systems. 
2. Predatory Innovation 
A predatory innovation claim alleges that that a monopolist changed 
its product specifically to interfere with competitors.42 For example, a 
plaintiff could allege that a defendant company changed compatibility 
specifications for its product solely to disqualify a competitor’s product 
from connecting to it. This type of claim is incredibly difficult to prove.43 
Such a claim under section 2 infers that a “monopolist, no less than any 
other competitor, is permitted and indeed encouraged to compete 
aggressively on the merits, and any success it may achieve solely through 
‘the process of invention and innovation’ is necessarily tolerated by the 
antitrust laws.”44 Courts have rightly been concerned with predatory 
innovation claims for two reasons. First, allowing courts to oversee product 
design “would be contrary to the very purpose of the antitrust laws, which 
is, after all, to foster and ensure competition on the merits.”45 Second, 
 
 40. In 2009, for example, Apple blocked a Google Voice application from installation on iOS 
because it “duplicates features that come with the iPhone.” Erica Ogg, Apple Blocks Google Voice 
App for iPhone, CNET (July 28, 2009, 1:25 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-10297618-37.html. 
 41. Google can theoretically take similar anticompetitive actions but, due to its commitment to 
Android as an open system and lack of restriction on the source of applications (consumers can install 
applications on Android without interfacing with Google’s online application repository), it will be 
much less successful if it tries to do so. 
 42. Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 43. See id. at 998–99 (explaining that a design change by itself does not violate section 2 even if it 
is performed by a monopolist and harms competitors as a result); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, courts are properly very skeptical about claims that 
competition has been harmed by a dominant firm’s product design changes.”). 
 44. Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 544–45 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(quoting Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir.1979)). 
 45. Id. at 544. 
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any attempt by the courts to weigh the benefits of design improvements 
and their anticompetitive effects would not be administrable.46 
Predatory innovation claims have been successful even though they 
face an uphill battle. In United States v. Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit held 
that Microsoft harmed competition by integrating Internet Explorer into 
the Windows 98 Operating System without showing “that its conduct 
serve[d] a purpose other than protecting its operating system monopoly.”47 
In Microsoft, the court found that although Microsoft made a general 
claim that its vision for “deeper levels of technical integration is highly 
efficient and provides substantial benefits to customers and developers[,]” 
it did not specify or substantiate those claims.48 The court found that 
Microsoft failed to meet its burden to show that its conduct served a 
purpose other than protecting its monopoly.49 Under Microsoft, any 
design improvement justifies an unassailable defense to antitrust liability 
under section 2. However, that improvement must be identified in 
sufficient detail in order for a court to identify it as such. 
It is possible to conceive of predatory innovation claims against 
Android and iOS. In fact, Apple has defeated similar claims in the past. 
In In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, the plaintiff challenged 
two design changes to Apple’s iPod software.50 These changes eliminated 
compatibility between iPods and third-party software and changed the 
encryption method which Apple used to transfer digital content to 
iPods.51 These changes rendered the plaintiff’s products incompatible 
with Apple iPods.52 Even with a public statement in evidence stating that 
Apple knew that its changes might break compatibility with the plaintiff’s 
products53 and Apple’s continued refusal to license its new changes to the 
plaintiff,54 the court granted summary judgment in Apple’s favor on one 
claim and reserved the other for further factual findings.55 The court 
determined that this valid business justification was enough to evade 
antitrust liability. 
Notice the structure of the above predatory innovation claim: It 
devolves from an action that takes an open system—the Apple iPod—
 
 46. Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 1000 (“There are no criteria that courts can use to calculate the 
‘right’ amount of innovation, which would maximize social gains and minimize competitive injury. A 
seemingly minor technological improvement today can lead to much greater advances in the future. 
The balancing test proposed by plaintiffs would therefore require courts to weigh as-yet-unknown 
benefits against current competitive injuries.”). 
 47. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 48. Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49. Id. at 67. 
 50. 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 51. Id. at 1143, 1146. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1144. 
 54. Id. at 1145. 
 55. Id. at 1148. 
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and closes it.56 By definition, this change eliminates compatibility among 
formerly compatible components. This could lead automatically to a 
predatory innovation claim if there were no pro-competitive justification 
for the actions limiting the compatibility with different devices. Because 
procompetitive justifications are easy to come by,57 it is simple for a 
technology company to improve its products that cut off compatibility 
with all competitive or reliant products. These changes help established 
software companies control markets that they have created but 
completely stifle innovation from startup competitors, essentially 
foreclosing competition and perhaps stagnating innovation in the market.  
Open systems are much less likely to face predatory innovation claims 
because they rarely limit compatibility with other components. For 
example, Android would not likely face a claim like the one against Apple 
because as an open system, it does not limit compatibility to certain types 
of software or hardware other than those that meet minimum industry 
standard specifications. Similarly, open systems are much less likely to 
change their parameters to foreclose competition without a significant 
reason for the change because open systems thrive on the potential for 
independent developers to add compatible innovative components. 
Inventors of widely used technology systems are most likely to use 
predatory innovation to capture as much of the market they created as 
possible. In the examples above, Microsoft and Apple sought to foreclose 
competitors from providing a service directly related to a system that 
they created. Proprietors of closed systems are by definition much more 
likely to engage in such activity, because such systems restrict 
interoperability and compatibility more than open ones. 
3. Refusal to Deal or License 
Under the Sherman Act, a company “generally has a right to deal, 
or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so 
independently.”58 But when a company has an established policy of 
dealing with competitors and subsequently refuses to deal with them 
without any efficiency justification, it can run afoul of competition laws.59 
Like predatory innovation, cessation of dealings without any efficiency 
justification is anticompetitive because the refusing company likely hopes 
that its cessation of dealings will hurt its competitor more than itself and 
that it can capture any market share lost by its competitors. 
 
 56. The iPod was an open system because many different pieces of software could read and write to 
it. By changing the iPod so that only iTunes could communicate with it, Apple closed the iPod system. 
 57. Examples of procompetitive justifications include security, ease of use, or protection of 
copyrighted material. 
 58. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (citing United States v. 
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). 
 59. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603–08 (1985). 
Baskin_64-HLJ-1727 (Do Not Delete) 9/25/2013 12:39 PM 
August 2013] COMPETITIVE MOBILE SOFTWARE 1739 
Intellectual property rights significantly complicate refusal to deal 
claims in the realm of technology. When a company holds a patent on a 
product, it has the right to exclude sales of that product to any other party 
and to choose whether to license the patent at all.60 No “court has imposed 
antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent or 
copyright.”61 This protection under patent law is significant in any market 
involving innovative technology because all competitors are likely to 
maintain large patent portfolios to guard their rights.62 These protections 
grant technology companies—like Google and Apple—significant leeway 
to refuse to deal with anyone. Given that these exclusionary rights last 
for twenty years,63 an eternity in technology markets, patent protection in 
effect forecloses all competition or use of the patent subject matter for a 
period long enough to ruin any startup effort to innovate in that field. 
Courts have approached patent-related refusal to deal or license in 
several different ways.64 In In re Independent Service Organizations 
Antitrust Litigation (“Xerox”), the Federal Circuit emphasized the right to 
exclude granted by the patent system, but it carved out “three limited 
categories in which a patent holder would not be immune from antitrust 
liability: (1) tying patented and unpatented products; (2) obtaining a 
patent through knowing and willful fraud; and (3) engaging in sham 
litigation.”65 Any action within the scope of a patent grant cannot violate 
antitrust laws, and the court would not examine the subjective intent of the 
refusal to deal with the competitor.66 
The Ninth Circuit applied antitrust law more expansively in Image 
Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak II”).67 Instead of 
granting holders carte blanche to exclude or refuse to deal or license, the 
court held that the use of a patent to exclude others is a presumptively 
 
 60. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 646–47 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting 
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964)) (“The patent laws which give a 17-year monopoly 
on ‘making, using or selling the invention’ are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and modify them 
pro tanto.”). 
 61. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th Cir. 1997). The 
court also noted that it makes no difference whether a “case involves a selective refusal to sell 
products protected by patents and copyrights, [and] not an absolute refusal to license.” Id. at 1216 n.9. 
 62. See, e.g., Evelyn M. Rusli & Claire Cain Miller, Google to Buy Motorola Mobility for $12.5 
Billion, N.Y. Times (Aug. 15, 2011, 7:34 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/google-to-buy-
motorola-mobility (“Our acquisition of Motorola will increase competition by strengthening Google’s 
patent portfolio, which will enable us to better protect Android from anticompetitive threats from 
Microsoft, Apple and other companies . . . .”). 
 63. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
 64. For a complete discussion of the courts approach to these types of cases, see Michael A. 
Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 (2002). 
 65. See Carrier, supra note 64, at 776–77 (citing In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 
1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 66. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 67. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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valid business justification.68 Upon remand from the Supreme Court, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected Kodak’s argument that patents on the parts it now 
refused to sell permitted them to refuse to deal without conflicting with 
the Sherman Act.69 The court held that Kodak could not use patent 
protections as a “pretext” to refuse to deal with or sell to competitors.70 
The Ninth Circuit went further to hold that evidence of the subjective 
intent and state of mind of Kodak employees can show pretext.71 Given 
that a manager at Kodak “testified that patents ‘did not cross [his] mind’ 
at the time Kodak began the parts policy,” the court found that Kodak 
could not use patent grants as a post-hoc rationalization for amending its 
policy to refuse to deal with ISOs.72 
The principle difference between the Ninth and Federal Circuit 
approaches lies in the examination of subjective intent evidence. The 
Federal Circuit refused to consider such evidence because the patent 
holder in Xerox merely enforced its statutory rights.73 Without evidence 
that the anticompetitive effect of the refusal to deal extended beyond the 
statutory grant, the court would not consider evidence of intent.74 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach seems more equitable than the 
Federal Circuit’s. While the goal of avoiding what may turn out to be a 
complex task of establishing intent is admirable, it is fundamentally 
unfair for a patent holder to hide behind the protections of that patent75 
as a post hoc rationalization. This is especially the case when a defendant 
firm has licensed the patent for use to the complaining entity in the past, 
only to withdraw licensing for an undisclosed reason, maintaining the 
defense: “We didn’t want to license anymore and we have a patent.” 
Declaring a defense purely under the scope of the patent smacks of 
anticompetitive conduct and clearly extends beyond the public policy 
supporting exclusive control of patented subject matter by a patent 
holder.76 
 
 68. Id. at 1218. 
 69. Id. at 1219. 
 70. Id. (“Neither the aims of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify allowing a 
monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct.”). Pretext 
can include acquisition of patents through fraud as in Xerox. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. (alteration in original). But see In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 
1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that right to exclude granted by patent is not modified by intent, 
therefore intent is irrelevant in patent-antitrust determination). 
 73. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1327. 
 74. Id. at 1328. 
 75. On such protection afforded to a patent holder is a limited monopoly over the invention, 
including the right of exclusion. 
 76. Two of the main policies underlying the right of exclusion to patent-holders are to encourage 
new inventions by guaranteeing the subsequent right of control and to place inventions in the public 
domain. When a firm has a patent over an invention and licenses that invention, it is taking advantage of 
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Refusal to deal in the context of large platforms like operating 
systems is problematic for innovation in the software industry. Small firms 
rely on the widespread availability and market penetration of these 
platforms when they release technology. Allowing platform owners to 
refuse to deal for any valid business justification permits them to 
cannibalize the business of smaller firms who have improved that platform 
by releasing products within it. For example, it would be entirely possible 
for Google to decide that it wants to modify Android to take on a degree 
of functionality that is already available on a popular third-party 
application. Google could refuse to allow users to install that application 
on Android, which would completely and anti-competitively preempt the 
firm that created the application. In this scenario, Google would have 
complete immunity because it could rely on any number of valid business 
justifications, such as increased security and stability of the platform itself. 
This justification should not enable large platform developers to co-opt 
market share from firms that justifiably rely on them to disseminate their 
products.77 
It remains clear from the examples above that a company has no 
duty to deal with any of its competitors absent previous dealings because 
companies have the right to choose with whom they deal.78 Apple has 
never explicitly licensed or sold iOS to anyone else and refuses to do so.79 
Therefore, Apple remains impervious to refusal to deal suits as it has 
never dealt with competitors in the past. By extrapolation, closed systems 
are less likely to deal with competitors because they lack interoperability 
and compatibility with many outside devices. Therefore, they are less 
likely to be liable for refusal to deal under current antitrust laws. 
Google, on the other hand, has a blanket policy of licensing Android 
to anyone.80 An open system like Android, run by a large corporation like 
Google, frequently deals with competitors. If it were to revoke those 
licensing agreements without a business justification, it could face antitrust 
scrutiny.81 Google would preclude liability, however, if it had a genuine 
 
its patent right of control. A subsequent refusal to deal on the grounds that it has the right to do so under 
the patent is anticompetitive and partially removes the patented material from the public domain. 
 77. Recently, Apple committed a lighter version of this when it replaced Google Maps with its 
own proprietary mapping software. However, Apple did not restrict Google from creating its own 
separate mapping application. Even so, Apple Maps continues to act as the permanent default on iOS, 
restricting some of the functionality once available to Google Maps. 
 78. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
 79. Apple has offered to license patents underlying iOS but has not yet completed any public 
deals. Nilay Patel, Apple Licensed iOS Scrolling Patent to Nokia and IBM, Offered License to 
Samsung, The Verge (Dec. 3, 2011, 4:28 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2011/12/3/2608407/apple-
license-ios-scrolling-patent-nokia-ibm-offered-samsung. 
 80. Licenses, Android Open Source Project, (last visited July 30, 2013) http://source.android. 
com/source/licenses.html. 
 81. Google’s recent acquisition of Motorola Mobility Ltd., an actual manufacturer of cell phones, raised 
these concerns among the Department of Justice and competitors. See Rusli & Miller, supra note 62.  
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business reason for refusing to license. Overall, by their nature, open 
systems are more likely to face antitrust liability for refusal to deal, but 
they are only likely to do so if they exclude former partners from access to 
the system, which would move them toward the closed end of the 
spectrum. 
As discussed above, inventors of both open and closed systems face 
a litany of antitrust concerns. Closed systems are more likely to face 
claims of illegal tying and predatory innovation. Open systems are more 
likely to face refusal to deal claims, but only if they transition towards a 
more closed environment. 
4. Antitrust Concerns Surrounding Intellectual Property 
Infringement Actions and Sham Litigation 
However, use of the court system through sham patent infringement 
litigation or by misuse of a patent in a monopolization scheme can give 
rise to antitrust liability.82 In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment 
Co., the Supreme Court found a valid antitrust cause of action where a 
company “conspired to establish a monopoly in an unpatented appliance 
beyond the scope of the patent and in violation of the anti-trust laws.”83 
The Court expanded this cause of action in Walker Process Equipment 
Inc. v. Food Machinery, where it held that “the enforcement of a patent 
procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the 
Sherman Act.”84 A Walker Process claim requires showing that a patent 
holder is attempting to enforce a fraudulently held patent in order to 
monopolize a market.85 Lower courts have further fleshed out these 
claims to allow antitrust claims based on illegitimate patent usage.86 
Fraud as perpetuated in Mercoid and Walker Process is a subset of 
an exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity87 to petition the government 
to take anticompetitive action against one’s competitors.88 The First 
Amendment protects the ability of all persons to petition the 
government.89 However, when a monopolist petitions the government to 
take action that would provide an anticompetitive benefit in its favor, 
 
 82. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664–65 (1944). 
 83. Id. at 662. 
 84. 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965). 
 85. Id. at 175. 
 86. See, e.g., Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952) (holding that pooling 
of patents to maintain monopoly gives rise to antitrust action); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 
601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that enforcement of a knowingly invalid patent can give rise 
to antitrust liability). 
 87. See generally E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 
(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
 88. See S.W. O’Donnell, Unified Theory of Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Litigation, 9 Va. J.L. 
& Tech. 8, 27 (2004). 
 89. U.S. Const. amend. 1. 
Baskin_64-HLJ-1727 (Do Not Delete) 9/25/2013 12:39 PM 
August 2013] COMPETITIVE MOBILE SOFTWARE 1743 
First Amendment freedoms collide with competition law. As one might 
expect, First Amendment constitutional rights trump those delineated in 
the Sherman Act: “[N]o violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated 
upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws.”90 
Noerr-Pennington immunity has expanded to situations including redress 
through judicial or quasi-judicial bodies.91 
The primary exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity is the sham 
exception.92 In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Industries, Inc., the Supreme Court articulated the modern 
standard to determine whether a lawsuit constitutes sham litigation for 
purposes of the Sherman Act.93 “First, the lawsuit must be objectively 
baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect 
success on the merits.”94 An objectively baseless suit is one in which the 
plaintiffs have no probable cause to institute the suit in the first place, 
similar to the probable cause standard used in the common law tort of 
wrongful civil proceedings.95 If a plaintiff first shows that the underlying 
suit was objectively baseless, she can then move to the second element of 
the test: to show that the subjective purpose of the litigation is to invoke 
government processes in a scheme to “interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor.”96 Noerr-Pennington immunity in the 
context of sham litigation is incredibly difficult to overcome, because the 
objective part of the test renders any lawsuit with a remote chance of 
succeeding impervious to objection under the Sherman Act. 
Whether a system is more open or closed does not bear on whether it 
is susceptible to sham litigation antitrust violations. These violations go to 
the character of the system’s designers. Even so, sham litigation represents 
a serious threat against smaller firms looking to innovate in markets 
related to iOS and Android. Small technology firms are usually composed 
of few employees, very few of whom (if any) are lawyers. The presence of 
a threat to their business in the form of an intimidating notice and pending 
lawsuit directed at the firm is incredibly likely to stop development of any 
product in its tracks. A small firm is unlikely to have the legal expertise to 
evaluate the claim and to have the resources to hire legal counsel. In the 
end, the firm is more likely to abandon the project in the face of intense 
pressure than risk losing everything in court. The litigation may have been 
 
 90. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 135. For an extended discussion of the origins of Noerr-Pennington 
immunity, see Sosa v. DirecTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929–32 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 91. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–12 (1972). 
 92. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. 
 93. 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993). 
 94. Id. at 60. 
 95. Id. at 62. 
 96. Id. at 60–61 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144). 
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a sham, but the firm will not contest it to find out, especially where the 
burden for proving the sham is stacked against the small firm. 
B.  Patent 
In addition to antitrust concerns, and of more importance to small 
companies, developers of networked systems rely on patent protections 
to incentivize investment in their products. Both Apple and Google use 
patents to protect their inventions. The Constitution grants Congress the 
power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”97 Congress responded by passing 
the Patent Act of 1790, establishing the patent system still in place in the 
United States today.98 An inventor of “any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement therefor” may patent that invention.99 This broad definition 
of patentable subject matter makes almost anything patentable, including 
pharmaceuticals, chemical processes, and more controversially, software 
and business methods.100 Furthermore, patentable items must be useful, 
novel, and nonobvious.101 For prospective patent holders, the novelty and 
non-obvious requirements present the biggest hurdle. 
Approved patents provide their inventors control over the patentable 
subject matter.102 Patent holders can recover damages, attorney fees, and 
even receive an injunction that prevents others from using the patented 
subject matter.103 These are significant powers that allow inventors to 
prevent others from copying their work.104 The Federal Circuit has 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals on all patent cases.105 This Subpart 
discusses the effects of enforcement of patent rights on open and closed 
systems. Developers of closed systems can and do leverage the exclusive 
use rights granted in the patent monopoly as a tool to prevent others from 
accessing or competing with their systems. 
 
 97. U.S. Const. art. I § 8., cl. 8. 
 98. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012). 
 99. Id. § 101. 
 100. See generally Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2001); John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 
1247 (2011). 
 101. See 35 U.S.C §§ 101–03. 
 102. See id. § 271 (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during 
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
 103. See id. §§ 283–85. 
 104. Most importantly, patent law contains no fair use or reverse-engineering exemptions. See 
generally Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100. 
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). 
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1. The Particular Problem of Overbroad Software Patents 
Software patents are a particular tool used by both Apple and Google 
to protect iOS and Android.106 Apple and Google hold large patent 
portfolios to prevent others from copying their inventions. For iOS and 
Android, those patents protect the software. The patentability of software 
has been controversial ever since approval of the first software patents.107 
In 1972, the Supreme Court rejected a patent for a software method 
applicable to a general purpose computer of any type.108 However, the 
Court soon changed its mind following the computer industry’s continued 
growth. In 1981, the Court upheld a patent that included a mathematical 
formula run by software in conjunction with significant “postsolution 
activity” outside the computer program in Diamond v. Diehr.109 In other 
words, software used in conjunction with already patentable subject matter 
itself became patentable. This ruling spawned “the doctrine of magic 
words” for which “software was patentable subject matter, but only if the 
applicant recited the magic words and pretended that she was patenting 
something else entirely.”110 The Supreme Court has assiduously refused to 
discuss the patentability of software since Diehr.111 Later Federal Circuit 
decisions have abrogated even the need for “magic words.”112 The modern 
test for patentability is whether a process passes the “useful, concrete, and 
tangible result” test.113 
The patentability of software presents several difficulties for the 
modern patent system and innovation in software systems like iOS and 
Android. First, a valid patent specification requires a description of the 
innovation (“enablement”) and a description of the “best mode” of 
implementing the innovation to allow practitioners to recreate it.114 These 
 
 106. Apple has patents protecting hardware related to iOS as well, but those patents are not as 
problematic as purse software patents. See infra note 133. 
 107. For a more complete history of the patentability of software, see Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100, 
at 8–11 and Andrew Nieh, Note, Software Wars: The Patent Menace, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 295, 300–06 
(2010). 
 108. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72–73 (1972) (holding that patenting of computer 
algorithms alone is impermissible). 
 109. 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981). 
 110. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100, at 9. 
 111. In Bilski v. Kappos, the Court rejected the machine-or-transformation test as the only test for 
determining patent eligibility of a process. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). But the Court refused to 
reconsider prior decisions by the Federal Circuit upholding software patents. Id. at 3248 n.40. 
 112. See generally State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 113. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 114. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint 
inventor of carrying out the invention.”). 
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requirements stem from one of the central components of patent policy: 
namely, place inventions in the public domain once the patent has 
expired.115 However, the Federal Circuit has severely curtailed both the 
enablement and best mode requirements for successful software patents.116 
Disclosure of source code is not required, nor is any disclosure regarding 
how to write the computer software.117 Such limited disclosure prevents 
many of the invention’s useful elements from reaching the public domain. 
Second, any iterative attempt to innovate by improving already 
existing software likely infringes that software’s patents. For example, the 
plain language of the Patent Act prohibits reverse engineering of 
software.118 Every time a computer runs software or even decompiles 
software—a process critical for reverse engineering—it makes a copy of 
that software in the memory of the computer. This copy almost certainly 
constitutes infringement.119 Patent holders can prevent any third-party or 
competitor from duplicating any part of software that contains a patented 
process because decompiling the software requires making a copy of the 
patented part and constitutes direct patent infringement. 
This restriction on reverse engineering stifles innovation in software 
much more than other patentable inventions. The Patent Act does not 
prohibit inventors from reverse engineering other patented inventions in 
order to make improvements on them. In fact, inventors can file patents 
covering improvements to already patented inventions.120 The structure of 
software and the way it runs on computers artificially restricts this type of 
iterative improvement. Furthermore, the typical software development 
cycle exacerbates this prohibition. 
More than many other types of invention, software relies on rapid 
incremental improvements. Such iteration is not possible when developers 
must reinvent the wheel because disclosure as to the best mode of 
implementation of a software patent is lacking and they cannot reverse 
engineer to discover it. Additionally, under the doctrine of equivalents, a 
court may find infringement even if the accused process does not explicitly 
 
 115. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100, at 24 n.86. 
 116. Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[W}here software 
constitutes part of a best mode of carrying out an invention, description of such a best mode is satisfied 
by a disclosure of the functions of the software.”). 
 117. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100, at 24 n.87. 
 118. The defenses of first sale, implied license, experimental use, and patent misuse probably do 
not apply to defend a patent infringement claim alleging reverse engineering of software. Id. at 29–36. 
 119. Id. at 19. 
 120. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”) (emphasis added). 
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fall within the patent but is substantially equivalent to the patented 
invention.121 
These patentability issues have presented significant impediments to 
open systems. For example, Android relies on third parties to bring its 
software to market on their cell phone hardware. Any group that controls 
a process patent incorporated into Android can prevent a third party from 
running Android on its system. This is because with Android installation 
on a new phone, the third party is infringing on the software patent for a 
particular process, even if 99% of the Android software itself does not 
infringe any patents.122 This scenario has already come to light in the 
form of patent licensing payments to Microsoft for each Android phone 
sold.123 This problem is specific to open systems like Android because 
they rely on compatibility with other devices, which may require use of 
third-party processes to connect those devices. 
Closed systems, on the other hand, do not rely as heavily on 
interoperability of third-party devices and are therefore much less likely 
to face this issue. iOS has not faced the same patent issues for several 
other reasons, the most significant being that it has been first in the 
market with many cell phone operating system innovations, and also 
because Apple has been particularly zealous in patenting its inventions. 
Both open and closed systems face a myriad of antitrust and patent 
concerns. As discussed above, antitrust liability generally arises more 
frequently for closed systems while open systems face greater difficulties 
with patent infringement. 
III.  Proposed Regulations to Improve Innovation 
The overview above outlines the current state of regulation of iOS 
and Android. Both Apple and Google have broad leeway to use antitrust 
laws and intellectual property rights to interfere with competitors and 
each other under the guise of exclusivity. Several changes to competition 
and intellectual property regulation could prevent these abuses. 
The overriding theme of current regulation is that open systems 
tend to commit fewer anticompetitive harms but are more likely to 
 
 121. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). See Warner-
Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). 
 122. One may point out that this exact same scenario applies to every classic patentable process, 
like the process to create a pharmaceutical. There are two differences in the case of software patents 
from those processes. First, in this case, one patented process that comprises a miniscule proportion of 
the entire software is preventing companies from licensing an otherwise completely legitimate product. 
Second, the structure of the software injury, and particularly that of cell phone operating systems, does 
not warrant the strong patent protections available in other industries. By default, innovation in the 
software industry occurs at an iterative pace; use of a patent controlling a fairly limited process to 
control the dissemination of an entire product creates more harm than good. 
 123. See Steve Lohr, Microsoft’s Patent Strategy Against Android, Bits Blog N.Y. Times (Oct. 3, 
2011, 12:20 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/microsofts-patent-strategy-against-android. 
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infringe on patented processes or violate the privacy of consumers. The 
balance of new regulation depends on whether one prioritizes innovation 
over property rights or vice-versa. 
It is more important to promote generative systems than to uphold 
laws protecting the intellectual property regimes in place, especially in the 
software field. In other words, the law should promote open systems above 
patent protection in high tech fields. Patent law promotes innovation by 
incentivizing invention. Especially in the world of software, development 
often involves iterative changes and user collaboration. It is important to 
foster this type of growth in order to maintain the forward pace of 
innovation in software. Furthermore, the promotion of open systems 
prevents restriction of information and maintains technology as a vibrant 
space for expression of new ideas.124 When systems are closed, society 
suffers because people are less able to develop their own modes of 
expression. Therefore, regulations of the industry in question should 
promote open, generative systems. 
Several changes to both antitrust and patent law will promote 
generative systems. Chief among these is a change to the standard of proof 
in sham litigation cases in order to prevent patent holders from interfering 
with legitimate inventions similar to those covered by their patents. 
A. Modernize the Sham Litigation Claim Through Use of 
Subjective Intent Evidence 
As discussed above, the use of the litigation process in an 
anticompetitive manner can lead to severe penalties under the antitrust 
laws. The standard for succeeding in one of these claims greatly favors 
defendants. In order to successfully state an antitrust claim revolving 
around sham litigation, a plaintiff must show that the underlying litigation 
is both objectively and subjectively unreasonable.125 Establishing objective 
unreasonableness requires showing that there is no probable cause to bring 
suit, a standard which means that any suit which has even a modicum of 
merit—even if strongly motivated by anticompetitive intent—will not 
lead to antitrust liability. There have been several recent proposals to 
expand the sham litigation exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity. 
Congress has begun to recognize the need for reform of the 
objective/subjective test. At a recent hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the House of 
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, several witnesses proposed 
liberalizing the objective/subjective test due to the difficulty of establishing 
 
 124. See Jonathan Zittrain, Protecting the Internet Without Wrecking It, Boston Review, (Mar. 
2008), http://bostonreview.net/forum/protecting-internet-without-wrecking-it. 
 125. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). 
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lack of probable cause.126 For example, evidence that executives of a 
company knew that a patent was invalid is part of the second subjective 
prong of the subjective/objective test. But under the current standard, a 
prospective plaintiff cannot use this information until it objectively 
proves that the litigation had no chance of success. This seems impossible 
if the Patent Office approves the patent, given that such approval is 
prima facie evidence of the patent’s validity. The ban on subjective 
evidence that clearly shows culpability is irrational because it allows 
those who admit to filing sham lawsuits to avoid liability. 
Liberalizing the sham litigation standard to permit the use of 
subjective evidence will significantly help promote open and generative 
systems. It will become more difficult for holders of questionable software 
patents127 to use the bully pulpit to prevent others from using their 
discoveries, which are likely not in the public domain, to innovate. Under 
a subjective standard, if it is obvious that a company is using its 
intellectual property to foreclose competition without caring about 
protecting its property, it becomes much easier for smaller companies to 
defend themselves from sham suits because complete destruction of the 
intellectual property claims is not required to win the suit. Additionally it 
will significantly lower the effectiveness of patent trolls,128 who rely on 
embellishing claims related to patents they received on assignment over 
inventions that they had no hand in creating. 
Allowing subjective evidence at the threshold of litigation has its 
downsides. Any sort of subjective evidence places a greater burden on the 
courts to sift through evidence, creating a larger likelihood that litigation 
will cost more, take longer to complete, and lead to less conclusive results. 
These are valid concerns. However, lengthier litigation that is defensible 
on its merits is preferable to a system in which large firms can launch 
blatant sham litigation against smaller ones with no fear of losing 
because the litigation has a scintilla of probable cause. 
Including subjective intent in this manner further promotes the goals 
of open and generative systems by deterring patent trolls and others who 
file sham litigation from proceeding with their claims in the first place. This 
frees smaller companies from the prospect of full-scale defenses of their 
products from tenuous-at-best infringement claims when such defenses 
may be prohibitively expensive. 
 
 126. See, e.g., Litigation as a Predatory Practice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual 
Property, Competition, and the Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 112th Cong. 9–20 (2012) 
(statement of J. Douglas Richards, Partner, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC). 
 127. Software patents are much more likely to be questionable because they tend to represent 
smaller iterative improvements rather than breakthrough innovations, leading to obviousness 
concerns. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve 
It 156–58 (2009). 
 128. Patent trolls, also known as non-practicing entities, are patent-holders who acquire patents 
without the intent to use or manufacture the patented invention. 
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A more cogent criticism of the inclusion of subjective intent 
evidence at the outset of sham litigation lies in the fact that including 
subjective evidence at the outset of a case—before examining the 
objective basis of a suit—may prohibit firms from exercising their explicit 
rights under intellectual property laws to exclude others from using their 
inventions. Intellectual property, particularly a patent, grants the holder 
the complete right of exclusion to an invention for a period of time in 
order to recoup the invention’s costs of research and development. The 
entire purpose of any infringement suit is to prevent another party from 
using a protected invention. This purpose in and of itself is anticompetitive, 
and any examination into the subjective intent of the complainant will 
show anticompetitive intent. All patent suits would then be sham litigation 
under the antitrust laws. This label would prevent intellectual property 
holders with monopoly power in certain industries from enforcing their 
valid rights to exclude others. 
This criticism misses a key ingredient of any sham litigation under 
the antitrust laws. The counterclaiming party must still show that the 
infringement claims will fail and that the primary purpose of the claims 
was anticompetitive. Valid intellectual property claims are unaffected. In 
Kodak II, the Ninth Circuit outlined this framework as it applied to a 
refusal to deal.129 The Ninth Circuit framework prevents a pretextual 
refusal to deal, even where valid patents support such a refusal.130 Use of 
subjective intent would proceed similarly in a sham litigation claim. Valid 
intellectual property rights would still be fully enforceable, and even failed 
litigation would not be a sham without strong evidence of anticompetitive 
intent.131 Promotion of generative systems requires reform of the 
objective/subjective test in order to prevent subjectively baseless patent 
infringement suits. As detailed below, promoting innovation requires 
several other patent reforms. 
B. Reduce the Number of Patent Infringement Actions 
The nature of the current software patent regime does not promote 
open and generative systems. Three fixes to the way courts interpret 
patent rights would promote significantly more innovation and 
 
 129. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219–20 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 130. Id. 
 131. The need to be sure that the intent behind alleged sham litigation is anticompetitive is strong 
enough to preserve First Amendment rights to petition the government for grievances in court. Any 
claim of sham litigation would need to be supported by clear and convincing evidence of 
anticompetitive intent, in addition to failed intellectual property claims in order to overcome the 
presumption in favor of free use of the judicial system without facing liability for doing so. See E. R.R. 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961). But see Wolfe v. George, 
486 F.3d 1120, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding statute prohibiting vexatious litigants from filing suit 
because it was rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and false statements are not 
immunized by the First Amendment right to petition). 
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compatibility among software systems by reducing the number of patent 
infringement actions: (1) Allow reverse engineering of software patents; 
(2) permit an independent invention defense; and (3) import examination 
of intent evidence in regard to business improvements that close systems 
from access by competitors. 
1. Allow Reverse Engineering of Software Patents 
Allowing reverse engineering of software would dramatically 
increase innovation within the software industry for three reasons. First, 
allowing reverse engineering would free competitors to examine each 
other’s improvements in detail without fear of patent infringement and 
improve upon them rather than imitate them. In fact, the iterative nature 
of innovation in the software industry requires reverse engineering. The 
inability to reverse engineer patented software forces developers to 
reinvent the wheel on every new project. Currently, the courts interpret 
the scope and latitude given to patents under the doctrine of equivalency 
by examining the degree of non-obviousness of the invention.132 A more 
pioneering invention is entitled to a broader range of equivalence than 
others.133 In other words, more significant inventions receive more 
protection under patent laws and a wider range of imitators are likely to 
infringe. But the standard pattern of innovation in the software industry 
involves considerable reuse of old code. Therefore, software is much less 
likely to be pioneering in nature and is likely to run into significant 
infringement issues under the doctrine of equivalency. 
Allowing reverse engineering alleviates the problem of infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalency. Under the current regime, programmers 
must resolve old problems without reverse engineering and then, faced 
with time pressures to release frequent software updates, add small 
iterative improvements to their code. If inventors are able to reverse 
engineer software, they will be able to focus on making significant 
improvements without resolving old problems. Furthermore, allowing 
reverse engineering will help return the content and best mode of 
implementation of the patented software to the public domain, fulfilling 
the public policy of disclosure which drives patent grants. 
Second, allowing reverse engineering would promote the creation of 
open, compatible, and generative systems because practitioners could to 
understand each formerly patented system in enough detail to create 
innovative compatible additions to formerly closed and walled-off 
software. For example, allowing reverse engineering of Apple’s patented 
 
 132. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100, at 40. 
 133. Id. 
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iOS code would allow competitors to make software that runs more 
efficiently and connects in new and unimagined ways with Apple devices.134 
Finally, permitting reverse engineering of patents will dramatically 
reduce the number of patent infringement claims filed by competitor 
corporations, freeing up resources for other more efficient activities. 
Allowing reverse engineering has its downsides. The primary danger 
is that competitor firms can discover how a patented product works and 
then use the protected knowledge to copy and create an infringing 
product. This argument draws little weight because in theory, there should 
be no need to reverse engineer any patented product. Theoretically, 
patenting an invention requires placing the know-how behind the 
invention in the public domain.135 However, as discussed above, software 
patents require almost no disclosure of the best practices or methods 
behind the invention to the patent office. Concededly, it is unclear how 
to accomplish such a disclosure short of adding hundreds of technical 
pages to software patents. This makes an even stronger case that reverse 
engineering may be the only way to place patented software in the public 
domain. In fact, intellectual property law has long accepted reverse 
engineering as a means to advance science and technology. The underlying 
discoveries of intellectual property lie in the public domain and protections 
are in place to prevent profit from direct infringement of protected 
inventions. However, marketing an improved invention has never been 
actionable under patent laws because it runs counter to their purpose.136 
Allowing reverse engineering directly improves software as much as it 
improves innovation in every scientific field. Allowing reverse 
engineering for software puts it on an even playing field. 
Established firms also worry that allowing reverse engineering of 
patented software will lead to higher levels of infringement because it 
will be easier to replicate complex algorithms in competitive software. 
Additionally, firms are concerned that the ability to reverse engineer 
with impunity will lead to significant security breaches, as those who look 
to invade secure software will have legal license to do so. These concerns 
ignore key aspects of patent and other legal protections. Patent protection 
is still valid after reverse engineering. The inventing party will still be able 
to sue any imitator for infringement derived from the reverse engineering, 
just not the act of reverse engineering itself. Second, removal of the 
protection against reverse engineering will not exacerbate any potential 
security issues because those who seek to breach software security systems 
 
 134. Apple would no doubt argue that this type of access severely degrades the stability and 
security of the iOS environment. At the base level, there is a tradeoff amongst generativity, 
compatibility, and security. Open systems that foster innovation need to be maintained in order to 
drive the economy forward, and that security can be achieved with this in mind, not despite it. 
 135. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 136. See id. § 101 (declaring improvements to be patentable subject matter). 
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are already breaching a whole host of other laws, including criminal 
statutes with more serious penalties than those imposed in patent 
infringement actions. Given these other laws, and the fact that they are 
significantly easier to prosecute than patent infringement cases, the 
prohibition on reverse engineering does not deter security breaches. 
Finally, because the current limitation arises from the plain language 
of the patent laws, allowing reverse engineering in software patents would 
require a change to the statute, which might be difficult. 
2. Allow an Independent Invention Defense 
Allowing independent inventors limited rights to use their inventions 
will prevent abusive patent infringement actions. Many commentators 
have proposed an independent invention defense to patent infringement.137 
Under this proposal, any inventor who unknowingly creates an already 
patented invention prior to receiving actual or constructive notice138 of 
the patent application will be immune from infringing on that patent. 
Congress enacted a more limited version of this proposal as part of the 
America Invents Act.139 The prior use defense under the current regime 
requires that the claimant show prior commercial use of the invention at 
least one year before the date of the filing of the patent.140 An independent 
invention defense would remove these one year and commercial use 
requirements.141 
An independent invention defense makes economic sense. Studies 
have shown that a 10% price reduction to an invention charged by a patent 
monopoly will reduce the patentee’s profits by 1% while decreasing the 
social costs of the patent monopoly by 19%.142 This evidence suggests that 
existing patent monopolies are suboptimal in favor of protection to the 
patentee. Furthermore, the case for monopoly rights in the use and 
control of intellectual property similar to those that exist in the use and 
control of tangible property is weak because it is possible for two parties 
to use intellectual property equally efficiently due to its non-competitive 
 
 137. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 
105 Mich. L. Rev. 475 (2006). 
 138. Publishing the details of the invention in a public repository or industry publication 
constitutes notice if the re-inventor receives that publication before she re-invents the patented subject 
matter. Publication of the details of the invention in recognized scientific journals or presented at 
conferences also constitutes public notice. A blind posting of an invention where a re-inventor is not 
likely to come across it does not constitute public notice. See id. at 486. 
 139. 35 U.S.C. § 273. 
 140. Id. 
 141. This defense is not especially relevant for the software industry due to the iterative process of 
software development and the short lead time between invention of a new patentable software process 
and its introduction to the market. 
 142. See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing 
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 Mich. L. 
Rev. 985, 989–90 (1999). 
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nature. Tangible property does not enjoy the same advantage.143 Finally, 
the independent inventor will not be able to sue others for patent 
infringement or violation of other patent rights. Those rights remain 
squarely with the first inventor to patent. 
Such a defense would eliminate the spurious patent infringement 
cases that have particular impact on the software industry.144 In particular, 
patent trolls and other entities that do not manufacture or invent their own 
technology plague the software industry. An independent invention 
defense will prevent patent trolls from undertaking two specific practices 
that warrant concern: First, patent trolls will no longer be able to file 
continuations on patents that track the improvements in competitor’s 
products because, by definition, competitors invented those products 
without prior knowledge of the patented product.145 Patent trolls will be 
much less pernicious in the software industry where companies develop 
almost all improvements with short lead times, meaning that those 
improvements are all most likely developed independently and without 
knowledge of other patented material. Independent software developers 
would not be subject to suit by patent trolls who hold patents but do not 
influence development of improved software in any way. 
Finally, an independent invention defense would allow software 
developers to independently create inventions without fear of patent 
infringement. Software development is not a difficult undertaking, but 
research into the patent pool to determine whether a software design is 
already prior art is nearly impossible for many of the small, independent 
development studios that drive software innovation.146 Given this industry 
structure, it is likely that most software inventions are independent of one 
another. Because constructive notice requires publication in relevant 
media or presentation to the software community, research into the 
software patent pool will become simpler and more streamlined. All other 
independently created software will be free from infringement actions. 
There are two primary obstacles to an independent invention defense. 
The first and most cogent is that first inventors will learn to issue notice 
immediately, foreclosing the independent invention defense. This is not 
necessarily objection to the defense; rather, it forces firms to publicize and 
disclose their inventions to the public in order to obtain maximum 
protection under the patent laws. This fulfills one of the primary policies 
behind patent protection: disclosure of inventions into the public 
domain. Critics are correct that increased notice will render the defense 
 
 143. Vermont, supra note 137, at 477. 
 144. See Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1525, 1526 n.5 (2007). 
 145. See id. at 1526. 
 146. Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, at 13–14,(Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016968. 
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moot, but the defense is not designed to allow all inventors who come in 
second place in an invention race to claim protection, it is designed to 
apply only to those who legitimately invent with no knowledge of the 
prior art. 
Second, opponents argue that firms will fake reinvention in order to 
take advantage of the defense. This argument is unconvincing for two 
reasons: (1) Fraud in the patent world is incredibly rare; and 
(2) fraudulently reinventing a product has a much lesser reward than 
fraudulently patenting it in the first place because the re-inventor does not 
receive exclusionary rights.147 Furthermore, re-inventors will have a 
stringent evidentiary burden to show that they reinvented before receiving 
notice. An independent inventor defense for software patents makes sense 
because of the structure of the industry and the high social costs of 
requiring programmers to reinvent the wheel every time they write a new 
program. This defense, combined with allowing reverse engineering, will 
considerably limit anticompetitive and meritless patent infringement 
actions. 
C. Increase Scrutiny of the “Business Improvements” Rationale 
Through an Examination of Subjective Intent 
Companies should not be able to mask anticompetitive changes to 
their products through a post hoc business improvement rationale. It is 
true that the law should give companies broad leeway to innovate without 
opening themselves up to antitrust liability under a predatory innovation 
scheme, but innovations masquerading as business improvements that 
eliminate compatibility with other devices should be subject to some 
antitrust scrutiny as opposed to none at all in order to promote more open 
and generative systems. Currently, under Allied Orthopedic Alliances v. 
Tyco Health Care Group, the courts find any test purporting to weigh the 
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of product improvements both 
burdensome on innovation and impossible to administer.148 However, this 
standard allows a company to get away with any business improvement. 
Those “improvements” clearly designed to destroy competitive 
interoperability under the guise of a marginal improvement in a product 
stoke the most concern. Such business improvements cause more 
anticompetitive harm than actual benefit. 
The solution to preventing pretextual business improvements lies in 
an examination of intent. Just as with illegal tying involving patent 
protection, the courts should look to the intent of the monopolist when 
evaluating product improvements whose byproducts include significant 
 
 147. See Vermont, supra note 137, at 502. 
 148. 592 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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reductions in compatibility with competitive products and services.149 Of 
course, the burden of proof regarding anticompetitive intent lies with the 
complainant. A defendant will have the opportunity to assert a valid 
business justification and the plaintiff will be able to rebut it with positive 
evidence of the defendant’s anticompetitive intent.  
These situations are somewhat analogous to tying. Business 
improvements that reduce compatibility accomplish the same effects as 
tying without explicitly forbidding the non-tied products. Where tying 
requires a company to affirmatively link the tying and tied products 
together, a business improvement that reduces compatibility in effect 
forces linkage between the tying and tied product with the exact same 
result. The only difference is the purported justification, which in many 
cases could be licensed or modified to prevent the compatibility issues it 
creates while still providing the sought after improvement. In reality, 
predatory innovation involves purposeful modification of a product to 
reduce compatibility with competitive products. 
In In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, Apple modified 
iTunes to encrypt files in a different, more secure way and then 
subsequently modified iTunes again to prevent any other product from 
reading or writing to iPods.150 The court found that the first change was a 
business improvement and refused to consider its anticompetitive effects, 
even though those effects were significant because they prevented 
compatibility between competitive products and the iPod.151 The Court 
did not rule on the second change because there were genuine issues of 
fact regarding whether it was actually a business improvement.152 
However, the second change itself eliminated all compatibility between 
the iPod and competitive software. This severely anticompetitive action, 
used to foreclose competition in the market, goes unchecked under the 
current antitrust jurisprudence. 
Intent is the key indicator in cases addressing business improvements. 
Courts have found tests regarding innovation non-administrable for good 
reason. It is nearly impossible to weigh the procompetitive effects of an 
innovation with the anticompetitive effects on competitors. Therefore, 
intent is a more effective gauge that allows courts to distill the 
anticompetitive actions of the parties. Courts are skilled at distilling and 
evaluating intent. Lawyers and judges have specific training to evaluate a 
person’s credibility and to determine one’s inner thoughts from her 
actions. In the most legislated branch of our legal system—criminal 
 
 149. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 150. 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 151. Id. at 1144. 
 152. Id. at 1147. This was probably because Apple failed to preclude all genuine issues of material 
fact on summary judgment, not because they did not show what would eventually be a valid business 
justification. 
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law—almost every major crime requires proof of knowing intent. Our 
legal system has established methods by which to determine an actor’s 
intent. There is no reason not to impute those skills into the antitrust 
realm. 
Some commentators have decried the use of intent in antitrust on the 
grounds that intent proves too much.153 In theory, competitors always 
intend to defeat each other, so an examination of the intent of competitors’ 
actions will always show anticompetitive intent.154 In practice, however, 
this is simply not the case. There is a huge gap between intentional 
anticompetitive actions to harm a competitor by eliminating compatibility 
and actions that harm a competitor through the introduction of a superior 
product. The latter is clearly a procompetitive action, the type that the 
antitrust laws seek to protect. The former does not rely on superior skill, 
industry, or foresight, but rather is a pure example of a company using 
monopoly power to foreclose competition by cutting off access to the 
market. An examination of intent can see through these anticompetitive 
actions in a way that is fair, equitable, and administrable by the courts. 
Conclusion 
The backbone of innovation in the software industry comes from 
the ability of users to grapple with, modify, and combine existing 
products to create iterative improvements. Android and iOS provide 
helpful examples of two differing tracks of software innovation. Both 
provide stable platforms for software developers to innovate in the 
mobile technology space. Continuing to promote innovation requires 
that small parties with few legal resources be permitted to continue 
innovation without facing anticompetitive threats from established 
players in the market and infringement actions from holders of 
questionable patents. This Note proposes amendments to the sham 
litigation doctrine under Noerr-Pennington, modifications to the patent 
regime allowing reverse engineering of software and an independent 
invention defense, and a modification to the business improvements 
justification under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Each of these changes to the regulatory scheme for networked 
systems will increase openness and, by extension, innovation. They do so 
by (1) limiting the use of the courts to block invention in the name of 
patent rights held by trolls and other non-practicing entities, (2) reducing 
meritless and burdensome patent infringement litigation, and 
(3) disallowing pretextual conduct by established industry players to 
anticompetitively reduce compatibility with their products. 
 
 153.  See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761, 794 
(2002). 
 154.  Id. 
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